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ABSTRACT
During the last few years there has been a renewed analysis in currency unions as a form of monetary
arrangement. This new interest has been largely triggered by the Euro experience. Scholars and
policy makers have asked about the optimal number of currencies in the world economy. They have
analyzed whether different countries satisfy the traditional “optimal currency area” criteria. These
include, among other: (a) the synchronization of the business cycle; (b) the degree of factor mobility;
and (c) the extent of trade and financial integration. In this paper I analyze the desirability of a
monetary union from a Latin American perspective. First, I review the existing literature on the
subject. Second, I use a large data set to analyze the evidence on economic performance in currency
union countries. I investigate these countries’ performance on four dimensions: (a) whether countries
without a national currency have a lower occurrence of “sudden stop” episodes; (b) whether they
have a lower occurrence of “current account reversal” episodes; (c) what is their ability to absorb
international terms of trade shocks; and (d) what is their ability to absorb “sudden stops” and
“current account reversals” shocks. I find that belonging to a currency union has not lower the
probability of facing a sudden stop or a current account reversal. I also find that external shocks have
been amplified in currency union countries. The degree of amplification is particularly large when
compared to flexible exchange rate countries.
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I.  Introduction 
  During the last few years there has been a renewed interest in analyzing the costs 
and benefits of monetary unions.  To a large extent this interest has been the result of the 
launching of the Euro in January, 1999.  Scholars, policy makers and analysts have asked 
what is the optimal number of currencies in the world.  More specifically, they have 
asked whether it would make sense for some countries to give up their national currencies 
and either adopt another country’s currency, or join other nations in creating a regional 
currency.  The first option – adopting another country’s currency – has generally been 
known as the “dollarization” question; the second option – creating a multi-nation 
currency – is known as the “independent currency union” question.
1 
  At the end of the 19
th century the world had a relatively small number of 
currencies.  There were a number of monetary unions – the two better known ones were 
the Latin Monetary Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union --, and many countries 
and territories used other county’s currency as legal tender.  These arrangements were 
dictated both by political as well as by geographical and economic considerations.  This 
is illustrated by the fact that the dependencies of Great Britain did not use exclusively 
sterling; they relied on a variety of currencies, including the U.S. dollar and the Indian 
Rupee (Muhleman, 1895). 
  Historically, the emergence of national currencies has been associated with 
political considerations and, in particular, with sovereignty.  Indeed, one of the first 
measures newly independent countries took during the nineteenth and twentieth century 
was to establish their own national currencies.  In his well-known article on optimal 
currency areas Mundell (1961) cited the following quote from John Stuart Mill: 
 
“[A]lmost all independent nations choose to assert their nationality by 
having, to their own inconvenience and that of their neighbours, a 
currency of their own.” (1894, p. 176).   
 
                                                 
1 “Dollarization” is used as a general term, even if the country were to adopt a currency other than the 
dollar, such as the Euro, or the Pound Sterling.   2 
  It is perhaps for this political reason that, historically, in the Latin American 
nations there have been limited discussions on the creation of regional currencies.  To be 
sure, some Latin American countries have become officially dollarized – Panama since 
1903, Ecuador since 2000 and El Salvador, since 2001--, and some, including Argentina 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s have seriously considered dollarization.  However, 
discussions on the creation of regional, or sub-regional, monies have never captured the 
imagination of Latin American politicians or scholars.  In 1926, for example, there was a 
proposal to create a monetary union comprising Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay. 
Although the supporters of this policy were prominent thinkers and politicians, and went 
as far as detailing the operational features of the union, there was very little political 
support for the idea.
2   Proposals to create a monetary union in Central America, or the 
Andean countries or, more recently, in Mercosur have never been more than academic 
exercises.  In a way this is surprising, since, at least in principle, certain groups of Latin 
American nations would seem to satisfy some of the basic criteria for an optimal currency 
area (OCA).
3 
  During the last few years a number of papers on (potential) monetary unions 
around the world have been published.
4  Most of these works have analyzed empirically 
whether particular groups of countries – including Latin American nations – satisfy the 
traditional and basic criteria for joining a monetary union.  In particular, most of these 
studies have analyzed: (a) the synchronization of the business cycle across countries and 
with respect to major nations such as the U.S.; (b) the degree of factor mobility within the 
potential monetary union; (c) macroeconomic convergence among the possible union 
members; and (d) the extent of trade and financial integration in the countries that would 
potentially form a monetary union (see Section II of this paper for a detailed, and 
selective, review of works on OCA in Latin America).  More recently, an important body 
of work has argued that the traditional OCA criteria are endogenous to the monetary 
regime.  In particular, the degree of trade and financial integration will tend to increase in 
                                                 
2 See Yañez, Bunge and Subercaseaux (1926).  It is interesting to notice that this proposal did not include 
Brazil. 
3  See, however, the review of works on the issue presented in Section II of this paper. 
4  See, for example, the papers published in volume 13(2002) of the North American Journal of Economics 
and Finance (as well as the literature cited in those papers).   3 
countries that share a common currency.
5  In Table 1 I present a list of countries (and 
territories) with currency unions; this list includes both dollarized countries as well as 
countries that belong to independent currency unions.   
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a number of issues related to monetary 
unions from a Latin American perspective.  I take, however, a different perspective from 
that of most works on the subject.  Instead of analyzing whether the Latin American 
countries satisfy the traditional OCA criteria, such as facing similar external shocks 
across countries, I analyze the empirical evidence on the economic performance of 
countries “without a currency of their own,” and I interpret these results from the 
perspective of the Latin American nations.  The empirical analysis presented in this paper 
is divided in two parts.  First, I investigate whether belonging to a currency union reduces 
the probability of a country being subject to: (a) “sudden stops” of capital inflows; and/or 
(b) “current account reversals.”  Both of these are important questions, since the Latin 
American nations have traditionally been subject to significant fluctuations in capital 
flows, and have experienced a large number of current account crises (Edwards, 2004).  
Second, I analyze the ability of monetary union countries to accommodate three types of 
external shocks: (a) terms of trade shocks; (b) sudden stops of capital inflows; and (c) 
current account reversals.  The question is whether, as opponents of monetary unions 
have argued, countries without a currency of their own incur in larger adjustment costs as 
a result of external shocks.  Again, this is a highly relevant issue for the Latin American 
nations, since they have historically had highly volatile terms of trade, and have been 
subject to wide variations in external conditions (Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005).  In 
performing this analysis I use a new and large cross-country data set, and I control for the 
role of other relevant variables. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In Section II I review the literature 
on currency unions in Latin America.  I show that the vast majority of these papers 
analyze whether the Latin Countries – or a subgroup of them – satisfy the OCA criteria.  
In Section III I use a new comparative data set to analyze economic performance in 
countries with currency unions, from a Latin American perspective.  More specifically, I 
investigate whether countries without a currency of their own have a lower probability of 
                                                 
5  See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1999) and Rose and Engel (2002).   4 
experiencing two type of shock that are common in Latin America – sudden stops of 
capital inflows and current account reversals.  In performing this analysis I use random-
effect probit regressions on pooled data.  In Section IV I analyze the way in which 
external disturbances affect real growth in countries with different monetary regimes.  I 
present a model of the dynamics of GDP per capita growth, and I investigate whether the 
impact of external shocks on growth is different in countries without a currency of their 
own, or monetary union countries, and in countries with a national currency.  Finally, in 
Section V I provide some concluding remarks, and a word of caution on how to interpret 
the empirical results presented in this paper.  There is also a data appendix.   
 
II.  Monetary Unions in Latin America 
  In this section I discuss briefly and selectively the literature on currency unions in 
Latin America.  I define a country as belonging to a currency union if it does not have a 
currency of its own, and uses a “common currency” with other countries.  This “common 
currency” could be either another nation’s currency (i.e. the U.S. dollar or the Euro) or it 
could be a regional currency.  The section is divided in two parts: First, I briefly deal with 
the theoretical literature on optimal currency areas.  In particular, I discuss what has come 
to be known as the “OCA criteria,” or prerequisites for a country successfully joining a 
currency area.  Second, I provide a brief review of the empirical literature on currency 
unions in Latin America.  
II.1  Optimal Currency Areas:  Theory and Policy Criteria  
In his seminal 1961 paper Robert Mundell developed the modern theory of 
optimal currency areas.  The main conclusion of his analysis was that “the optimum 
currency area is the region.”  By this, Mundell meant that when it comes to determining 
the scope of specific currency, the relevant entity is not a nation, but rather a region 
characterized by price and wage flexibility, factor mobility, trade integration and similar 
external shocks.  He argued that the in North America there were two optimal currency 
areas: one corresponding to the eastern United States and Canada, and the other 
corresponding to the western U.S. and Canada. 
Although Mudell’s original contribution is not technical – indeed, there isn’t a 
single equation or diagram in the paper --, he was very explicit in determining his   5 
optimality criteria.  According to him, “[O]ptimality is here defined in terms of the ability 
to stabilize national employment and price levels’ (Mundell 1961, p. 179).  That is, his 
criterion is perfectly equivalent to minimizing a loss function on the square deviations of 
employment from its long term trend level, and of inflation from its target.  In that sense, 
Mundell’s criteria of optimality is consistent with that used in modern macroeconomic 
analyses.  
Subsequent research attempted to make Mundell’s theory operational, by 
developing a “checklist” of criteria that countries should satisfy in order to qualify as 
candidates for a (successful) currency union.
6   Generally speaking, it was though that in 
countries than satisfied these criteria the benefits of joining a currency union exceeded 
the costs of doing so.  Initially this “checklist” was restricted to the type of real and 
structural variables and factors emphasized by Mundell’s original article.  With time, a 
number of macroeconomic, political, institutional and monetary variables have been 
added to this checklist.   
By now the list of OCA criteria, or main prerequisites for joining a currency 




·  Factor mobility, and in particular labor mobility, across the members of 
the potential union. 
·  High level of trade in goods across the members of the union.  
·  Different (or diversified) composition of output and trade across 
countries. 
·  Price and wage flexibility across members of the union. 
·  Similar inflation rates across countries. 
·  Financial markets should be integrated across countries. 
·  Absence of “fiscal dominance” in the individual countries.  
·  Low, and similar, levels of public sector debt in the different countries. 
                                                 
6  Another two important early contributions are McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), 
7   See, for instance, Bayoumi (1994), Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1997), De Grauwe (2001) and Tavlas 
(1991, 1992).   6 
·  Similarity (or synchronization) of external shocks to which the different 
countries are exposed to. 
·  Political coordination across countries. 
 
The main point of this “Decalogue” is that if these conditions are met, the 
members of the union would not need to rely heavily on (bilateral) exchange rate changes 
when subject to external shocks.  Countries that satisfy the Decalogue would have a 
reduced need for implementing “expenditure switching policies.”  Thus, for these 
countries the benefits of a currency union – in terms of enhanced credibility, lower 
transaction costs, and lower and more stable inflation – would exceed the (potential) costs 
of giving up the exchange rate as a policy tool.  As Tavlas (1993) and Mongelli (2002), 
among others, have pointed out, such an extensive list of prerequisites introduces a 
number of practical policy problems.  These include:  (a) the need to establish a ranking 
of criteria according to their importance; and (b) how to deal with cases when a potential 
OCA member satisfies some of the criteria, while another potential member satisfies a 
different subset of them.  The Euro zone, for instance, prioritized fiscal, monetary and 
financial considerations through the Maastricht Treatise.  This, however, needs not be the 
case for other currency unions. 
  One of the costs of a belonging to a currency union is that member countries give 
up monetary independence.   However, the extent to which monetary independence is 
actually lost will depend on the exact nature of the monetary union.  If the country in 
question unilaterally adopts another nation’s currency – as in the case of unilateral 
dollarization – monetary independence will be fully lost.  Moreover, in this case, 
seignorage will also be lost.   In Latin America, for example, this has been the case in 
Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador.
8  If, on the other hand, a new common currency is 
adopted, monetary independence will only be lost partially.  This is so because members 
of the union will be represented in the governance structure of the new common central 
bank, and, at least in principle, would have a say on how the common or regional central 
bank policies are determined.   
                                                 
8 See Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).   7 
There are circumstances, however, when loosing monetary independence may not 
be a cost.  This would be the case, for instance, if the country in question has historically 
abused this independence, and has generated very high levels of inflation.  Indeed, under 
these circumstances giving up the national currency and joining a currency union is a way 
of “tying the policy makers’ hands,” and achieving credibility.   This “credibility effect” 
of joining a monetary union – or more precisely, of joining a credible monetary union – 
has been emphasized with respect to the Euro zone and the new EU members from 
Central and Eastern Europe.  It has also been discussed in the Latin American context as 
one of the advantages of (unilateral) dollarization.  This point was made by Dornbusch 
(2001), who argued that by achieving credibility, Latin American countries that 
dollarized would experience a decline in (real) interest rates, and, thus, higher investment 
and faster growth.   
  As a number of authors have argued, many of the criteria listed in the “OCA 
Decalogue” listed above are endogenous to the monetary and exchange rate regime 
(Frankel and Rose, 1998).   More specifically, (neighboring) countries that share a 
common currency will experience an increase in bilateral international trade in goods, a 
point forcefully made by Rose (2000), and Rose and Van Wincoop (2001), among others.
  
Edwards (1999), and Powel and Sturzenegger (2003), on the other hand, have 
investigated the way in which the monetary regime affects interest rate behavior and the 
cost of capital, and have argued that a common currency will tend to increase the degree 
of financial integration.
  An implication of this endogeneity argument is that the “OCA 
Decalogue” should be analyzed in a forward-looking fashion, trying to determine what 
would be the effect of adopting a common currency on many of these variables and 
criteria once the union is implemented.   
II.2  Currency Unions in Latin America:  A Selective Review 
Most studies on OCA in Latin America have analyzed whether the countries in 
the region satisfy the OCA criteria, or, more specifically, a subset of them.  In this 
subsection I review some of the most important contributions to this literature 
In an influential early paper, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) used Vector Auto 
Regressions to construct series of supply and demand disturbances in three regions:    8 
Europe, Asia and the Americas.
9  They then analyzed whether these disturbances were 
symmetrically distributed across the different countries in each of the regions.  Their 
results indicate that correlations of both output and inflation disturbances were low in the 
Americas.  Moreover, the groups of countries in the America’s region that exhibited a 
somewhat higher degree of correlation did not correspond either to NAFTA or Mercosur.  
For instance, the group with the highest co-movements in output and prices was Brazil, 
Ecuador and Peru.  The authors conclude that there is no evidence supporting the 
formation of a currency union involving Latin American countries – either among 
themselves, or with the U.S. or Canada.  Eichengreen (1998) extended this work, and 
analyzed whether the countries of Mercosur – at the time formed by Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay – constituted an OCA.  His analysis was triggered by the 
perceived instability between the bilateral exchange rate between the Brazilian and 
Argentine currencies.  His empirical analysis concentrated on understanding the nature 
and consequences of exchange rate variability within the Mercosur nations.  To do this he 
regressed alternative measures of exchange rate volatility on four of the “OCA criteria”:  
synchronicity of output disturbances, commodity composition of trade, bilateral trade, 
and country size.  He concludes that in the second half of the 1990s real exchange rate 
volatility in the Mercosur nations was significantly larger than what his model predicted. 
He argued, however, that a regional currency was not an effective option for reducing 
volatility; in his view the countries of Mercosur did not satisfy many of the OCA criteria.   
  Licandro Ferrando (2000) and Lavagna and Giambiagi (2000) also analyzed 
whether the countries of Mercosur satisfied (some of) the OCA criteria listed in our 
“Decalogue.”  Licandro Ferrado (2000) focuses mostly on one of the synchronicity of 
real shocks.  He constructs measures of supply shocks for Mercosur, NAFTA and the EU 
and analyzes the extent to which these are correlated across countries.  He concludes that 
the degree of correlation among Mercosur nations is significantly lower than that of EU 
nations.  Shocks correlations among NAFTA countries are somewhat higher than in 
Mercosur.  His conclusion is that Mercosur is far from satisfying the OCA criteria.  
Lavagna and Giambiagi (2000) take a somewhat different approach, and concentrate on 
macroeconomic convergence and political coordination.  After analyzing historical data 
                                                 
9   The Americas include 13 nations, including those in NAFTA and Mercosur.     9 
for Argentina and Brazil, and simulating macroeconomic conditions, the authors 
concluded that in (late) 1998 the large countries of Mercosur were not ready for forming 
a monetary union.   
  Larrain and Tavares (2003) use data for South and Central American countries to 
analyze the extent to which some of the OCA criteria are satisfied.  An important 
contribution of their paper is that the authors make a distinction between two types of 
currency unions: dollarization and regional currencies.  They use an approach similar to 
that of Eichengreen (1998) and use regressions to analyze the determinants of real 
exchange rate volatility.  They also analyze the degree of asymmetry (or lack of 
synchronization) of output shocks, the composition of exports, and the extent of bilateral 
trade.  Based on their analysis they conclude that dollarization maybe an option for the 
Central American nations; neither dollarization nor a regional currency appears to be a 
good option for South America.   
Horchreiter and Siklos (2002) considered both static and dynamic arguments in 
their investigation of the potential for currency unions in Latin America.  These authors 
centered their analysis on the nature of aggregate shocks, fiscal policy, and business cycle 
synchronicity.  They investigated whether a treatise in the nature of Maastricht would 
help the Latin American nations achieve macroeconomic convergence.  Their conclusion 
was that “the LAC countries are not generally good candidates for monetary union.”  
Berg, Borenztien and Mauro (2002) also analyze the OCA criteria for a large group of 
Latin American nations.  They focus on: (a) the pattern of trade; (b) output growth co-
movements; (c) financial variables co-movement; (d) political coordination; and (e) 
credibility.  They conclude that “an independent common currency does not appear to be 
warranted for Latin American countries,” and that “there is no obvious case for 
dollarization.”   
In an extensive study, Hochreiter, Schmidt-Hebbel and Winckler (2002) analyzed 
Latin America’s prospects for a currency union, from the perspective of the European 
experience.   They make the important point that OCA criteria are dynamic, in the sense 
that countries that adopt a common currency tend to experience an improvement in some 
of the key OCA prerequisites, such as the volume of bilateral trade and the degree of 
financial synchronization.  Based on the European experience, the authors emphasize the   10 
need to coordinate fiscal policy in OCA countries.  They also discuss the importance of 
labor mobility and flexibility, and financial integration and supervision.  These authors 
arrive to two conclusions: “The available evidence on the costs and benefits of 
abandoning national currencies suggest significantly less favorable conditions in LAC 
than in Europe.” And, “[D]ollarization seems to be more feasible for smaller LAC 
economies.”  In a related paper, Kopits (2002) draws lessons from the new EU accession 
countries for Latin America, and concludes that in the absence of better macroeconomic 
policy coordination the Latin nations are not good candidates for a currency union.    
  Belke and Gros (2002) analyze the effects of exchange rate and interest rate 
volatility on macroeconomic outcomes in the countries of the Southern Cone.   They 
conclude that higher volatility has negative effects on both employment and private 
investment.  The authors, however, caution on the implications of these findings for the 
currency union debate; a complete analysis of the issue, they point out, would require 
investigating other OCA criteria, including the possibility of coordinating 
macroeconomic (and especially fiscal) policies.   
The paper by Panizza, Stein and Talvi (2003) is one of the few that provides an 
explicit and complete cost-benefit analysis of the decision to join a currency union.  They 
analyze whether it would pay off for the Central American nations to give up their 
currencies and unilaterally adopt the U.S. dollar as legal tender.
10  They consider several 
benefits of dollarization, including lower real exchange rate volatility, increased 
credibility, reduced financial fragility, and a higher volume of intraregional trade.  The 
main source of costs is the lost of monetary independence; the extent of these costs are 
related to the nature of real shocks, the degree of labor mobility, and the extent to which 
the monetary authorities are willing to use their independence (this is the “fear to float” 
issue).  Their conclusion is that “several of the countries under study should give 
dollarization a serious consideration.”  Edwards and Magendzo (2003, 2006) analyzed 
the overall world experience with dollarization.  They use a variety of statistical 
techniques, including matching coefficients and treatment regressions.  Their findings 
indicate that dollarized countries have not had a different real GDP growth experience 
                                                 
10   This, in fact, was done by El Salvador in 2001.     11 
than countries with a currency of their own.  Inflation has been significantly lower in 
dollarized countries, while GDP volatility was larger in dollarized economies.    
After recognizing the endogeneity of many of the OCA criteria, Calderón, Chong 
and Stein (2002) investigated the likely effects of adopting a common currency on Latin 
America’s intraregional trade and business cycle synchronization.  Their results suggest 
that, contrary to the findings by Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose and Engel (2001) for 
the EU, the impact of a currency union on these two variables is rather small in the Latin 
American region.   
Alesina, Barro and Terneyro (2002) use a very large data set to analyze the “best 
monetary anchor” for a number of countries; the alternative anchors considered are the 
US dollar, the euro, and the yen.  Their analysis is based on the effects of monetary 
integration on trade, price volatility and output volatility.  Their results suggest that there 
is an unambiguous “best anchor” for only a handful of Latin American nations: The Euro 
for Argentina, and the US dollar for Costa Rica and Honduras.  However, the fact that for 
Mexico and Ecuador the Euro is the “best” anchor according to one of the criteria, casts 
doubts on this analysis.  Tenreyro and Barro (2003) implement an instrumental variables 
approach to deal with the endogeneity of some of the OCA criteria.  Their results indicate 
that sharing a common currency increases the volume of bilateral trade, increases the co-
movements of national price levels, and decrease the co-movement of national outputs.   
Powell and Sturzenegger (2003) analyzed an often forgotten endogenous aspect of 
currency unions: the effects of a common currency on financial integration and country 
risk.  They use an event study methodology to analyze whether a reduction in currency 
risk – something that, in their view, would automatically happen if a country unilaterally 
dollarizes – results in a decline country risk.  Using European data they find that there is a 
positive (and causal) correlation between currency and country risk premia.  However, 
the evidence for their group of Latin American countries is not as strong as the evidence 
for the European nations.   
To summarize, most of the literature on (potential) currency unions in Latin 
America has focused on investigating whether the countries in the region – or a subgroup 
of countries – satisfy (some of) the traditional OCA criteria.  Most of these papers have 
concluded that Latin America does not constitute an optimal currency union.  The results   12 
discussed in this section also cast doubts on the desirability of subgroups of Latin 
American countries of joining a currency union.    
 
III.  Monetary Unions and External Crises: An Empirical Analysis from a Latin 
American Perspective 
   In this and next section I analyze empirically issues related to monetary unions in 
Latin America.
11  However, in contrast with most of the existing literature reviewed 
above, I don’t ask whether countries satisfy some of the OCA criteria.  Instead, I use a 
new large data set to investigate the international evidence on the effects of currency 
unions on economic performance.  I focus on two aspects of performance that are 
particularly important for the Latin American nations: (a) the probability of facing 
external crises, in the form of either sudden stops of capital inflows, or large reversals of 
current account deficits.  And, (b) the effects of different shocks on economic growth, 
under alternative exchange rate and monetary regimes, including currency unions.  In this 
Section I deal with the first set of questions, while in Section IV I address the second set 
of issues. 
III.1 Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals in Latin America 
  Latin America’s economic history has been characterized by recurrent and 
massive external crises.  Large devaluations have rocked the economies of almost every 
country at one point or another during the last six decades.  Many of these crises had their 
origins on large “sudden stops” of capital inflows, and/or were characterized by large and 
very rapid “current account deficits reversals.”
12    
  Table 2 presents tabulation data on the incidence of sudden stops for the period 
the period 1970-2001; Table 3 contains data on the incidence of current account 
reversals.  In both Tables I have divided the sample in six groups of countries – 
Advanced (industrial) countries, Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, Africa, Middle East 
and North Africa, and Eastern Europe.  Each Table also includes a Pearson test for 
equality of incidence across groups of countries.  I have defined a “sudden stop” episode 
                                                 
11 In the empirical sections of this paper the “Latin American” countries include the countries that the 
International Monetary Fund groups in the Western Hemisphere region.  These include Latin American and 
Caribbean nations. 
12 See, for example, Calvo and Talvi (2005) and Edwards (2004).   13 
as an abrupt and major reduction in capital inflows to a country that up to that time had 
been receiving large volumes of foreign capital.  More specifically, I imposed the 
following requirements for an episode to qualify as a “sudden stop”:  (1) the country in 
question must have received an inflow of capital (relative to GDP) larger than its region’s 
third quartile during the two years prior to the “sudden stop.”  And (2), net capital inflows 
must have declined by at least 5% of GDP in one year.
13  On the other hand, a “current 
account reversal” – reversals, in short -- is defined as a reduction in the current account 
deficit of at least 4% of GDP in one year.
14   
  As may be seen from Table 2, the global historical incidence of sudden stops has 
been 6.4%.  Different groups of countries, however, have experienced very different 
realities, with the incidence being highest in the Middle East (11.3%) and lowest in the 
advanced nations (3.7%).  The Latin American nations have the second highest incidence 
of sudden stops, with almost 8% of all year-country observations. 
  The tabulation on current account reversals in Table 3 indicates that the aggregate 
incidence rate has been 12.8%.  As may be seen, Latin America has had one of the 
highest incidence of current account at 16%; the advanced (industrial) countries have had 
the lowest incidence at 2.4%.
15 
From an analytical perspective sudden stops and current account reversals are 
highly related phenomena. There is no reason, however, for their relationship to be one-
to-one.  Indeed, because of changes in international reserves, it is possible that a country 
that suffers a sudden stop does not experience at the same time a current account reversal.  
An analysis of the global data indicates that for the complete sample (3,106 observations) 
46.8% of countries subject to a sudden stop also faced a current account reversal.  At the 
same time, 22.8% of those with reversals also experienced (in the same year) a sudden 
stop of capital inflows.  The regional data show that joint incidence of reversals and 
                                                 
13 In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative definitions of sudden stops, 
which considered a reduction in inflows of 3 and 7 of GDP in one year.  Due to space considerations, 
however, I don’t report detailed results using these definitions. 
14 I also used an alternative definition.  The qualitative nature of the results discussed below, were not 
affected by the precise definition of reversals or sudden stops.  See Edwards (2004). 
15  As pointed out above, the Latin American nations have also been subject to recurrent large devaluation 
crises.  Of course, these are eliminated if a country becomes “dollarized.”  Independent currency unions 
eliminate bilateral devaluations in the member countries; it is still possible, of course, that the common 
currency suffers a major devaluation relative to a convertible currency.  This was the case of the CFA Franc 
in January, 1994.     14 
“sudden stops” has been highest in Africa, where approximately 59.3% of sudden stops 
happened at the same time as current account reversals, and in Latin America where 25% 
of reversals coincided with sudden stops.  For every one of the regions, as well as for the 
complete sample, the Pearson c
2 tests have very small p-values, indicating that the 
observed differences across rows and columns are significant.  That is, these tests suggest 
that although there are observed differences across these phenomena, the two are 
statistically related.  Interestingly, these results do not change significantly if different 
definitions of reversals and sudden stops are used, or if alternative configurations of lags 
and leads are considered.  
III.2  An Empirical Model 
A number of studies, including Edwards (2002, 2004) and Frankel and Cavallo 
(2004) have found that sudden stops and current account reversals are costly in terms of 
growth.  Countries that experience either of these phenomena have gone through 
significant and rather large declines in the rate of GDP growth.  An important question, 
and one that I address in this Section, is whether a country’s exchange rate/monetary 
regime affects the probability of experiencing a sudden stop or a current reversal.  In 
particular, I am interested in understanding whether countries that belong to monetary 
unions have had a lower probability of experiencing these phenomena.  A positive answer 
to this question would be important for the Latin American nations, as it would provide 
them with an institutional arrangement that would help them reduce the incidence of 
these negative events.  In other words, reducing the probability of sudden stops and/or 
current account reversals would constitute an additional “benefit” of currency unions, a 
benefit that should be taken into account when evaluating the net effects of abandoning 
the country’s currency and joining a union.  
In order to understand further the forces behind sudden stops and current account 
reversals, and to investigate the (potential) role of currency unions, I estimated a number 
of panel equations on the probability of experiencing these two penomena.  The empirical 
model is given by equations (1) and (2): 
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1,    if   , 0
* > tj r  
(1)    tj r         =       
        0,  otherwise.    
 
 
(2)   
*
tj r    =     tj tj e aw + . 
 
Variable  jt r is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country j in period t 
experienced a sudden stop (current account reversal), and zero if the country did not 
experience a sudden stop (current account reversal).  According to equation (2), whether 
the country experiences a sudden stop (current account reversal) is assumed to be the 
result of an unobserved latent variable
*
tj r .  
*
tj r , in turn, is assumed to depend linearly on 
vector tj w .  The error term  tj e is given by given by a variance component model:  
. tj j tj m n e + =    j n is iid with zero mean and variance
2
n s ;  tj m is normally distributed with 
zero mean and variance  1
2 = m s .  One of the  tj w in equation (2) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if during that year the country in question belonged to a currency 
union; that is, if the country in question was dollarized or if it was a member of an 
independent currency union.  The data set used covers 187 countries, for the 1970-2001 
period.  Not every country has data for every year, however; the panel is unbalanced.  See 
the Data Appendix for exact data definition and data sources.   
In determining the specification of this probit model I followed the literature on 
external crises, and I included the following covariates:
16 (a) The ratio of the current 
account deficit to GDP lagged one period.  (b) A sudden stop dummy that takes the value 
of one if the country in question experienced a sudden stop in the previous year.  (c) An 
index that measures the relative occurrence of sudden stops in the country’s region 
(excluding the country itself) during that particular year.  This variable captures the effect 
of “regional contagion.”  (d) The one-year lagged rate of growth of domestic credit.  (e) 
The lagged ratio of the country’s fiscal deficit relative to GDP.  (f) The country’s initial 
                                                 
16  See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002).   16 
GDP per capita (in logs).  And, (g) a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
country in question belongs to a currency union.  This dummy is called CU.  The 
coefficient of this variable is of particular interest in this analysis, since it captures the 
effect of currency unions on the probability of a country experiencing a reversal or a 
sudden stop.  As is discussed below, in some of the regressions I interact the dummy 
variable CU with other regressors.    
III.3  Basic Results 
The results obtained from the estimation of this variance-component probit 
model for a sample of large countries are presented in Table 4.
17  Columns A through C 
refer to the probability of a current account reversal; columns D through F are for a 
sudden stop of capital inflows.  I first discuss the results for current account reversals.  
As may be seen, the vast majority of coefficients have the expected sign, and many of 
them are significant at conventional levels.  The results may be summarized as follows:  
Larger (lagged) current account deficits increase the probability of a reversal, as does a 
(lagged) sudden stop of capital inflows.  The results also support for the contagion 
hypothesis: the variable that measures the incidence of sudden stops in the county’s 
region is significantly positive in all of the equations.  There is also evidence that a faster 
rate of growth of domestic credit increases the probability of reversals.  Countries with 
higher GDP per capita have a lower probability of a reversal (coefficient marginally 
significant in some regressions).  Form the perspective of this paper, the most important 
result is that the coefficient of the currency union dummy is not significant in any of the 
regressions.  In order to investigate whether CU affected the probability of a crises in an 
indirect way, I also included it interacted with other of the regressors.
18  Once again, the 
coefficient was not significant.  The last three columns in Table 4 present the result from 
the random effect probit estimates for sudden stops.   Broadly speaking these results 
support those for current account reversals.  The currency union indicator is never 
significant (although now some of the point estimates are positive).  An increase in the 
(lagged) current account deficit increases the probability of a sudden stop, as does a 
                                                 
17  Due to data availability, some of the countries/territories in Table 1 are not included in the regression 
analysis.  Many of the very small countries don’t have data on GDP or other key macroeconomic variables.  
18 It is important to notice, however, that in probit models the interpretation of interactive variables is 
different than in linear models.     17 
higher incidence of sudden stops in the region.   A somewhat surprising result is that 
according to these results, with other things given, a higher “initial” level of GDP per 
capita increases the probability of a sudden stop.   
  To summarize, the results obtained from the random effect probit panel 
regressions indicate that currency union countries don’t face a lower probability than 
countries that have a national currency, of facing either sudden stops or current account 
reversals.  The next question, and one addressed in the Section that follows, is whether 
currency union countries are affected by external shocks – including reversals and sudden 
stops – in the same way than countries with a national currency. 
 
IV.  Monetary Unions and Economic Performance: An Empirical Analysis from a 
Latin American Perspective 
  In this section I investigate whether belonging to a monetary union affects the 
way in which external shocks affect a county’s rate of economic growth.  As pointed out 
in Section II of this paper, one of the potential costs of monetary unions is that countries 
give up independent monetary policy.  This means that exchange rate adjustments cannot 
be used as a way of absorbing external shocks, including terms of trade shocks, current 
account reversals and sudden stops.   How large these costs actually are is an empirical 
issue.  In principle, if the countries belonging to a currency union have wages and prices 
flexibly – one of the OCA criteria – this cost would be rather low.  In this case external 
shocks can be accommodated through changes in (real) wages and in domestic relative 
prices. 
  The question of how to accommodate international terms of trade shocks is 
particularly important for the Latin American nations.  Traditionally, the countries in the 
region have been subject to substantial volatility in terms of trade shocks.   For the period 
1970-2001, for example, the standard deviation of rate of change of the terms of trade 
was 16.9%.  For the same period terms of trade volatility for the advanced countries was 
only 6.5%; it was 14.5% in Asia.         
IV.1  An Empirical Model 
The point of departure of the econometric analysis is a two-equation formulation 
for the dynamics of real GDP per capita growth of country j in period t.  Equation (3) is   18 
the long run GDP growth equation; equation (4), on the other hand, captures the growth 
dynamics process. 
 
(3)     j j j t r x g w q b a + + + = ~ . 
(4)      jt jt jt jt j jt u v g g g e g j l + + + - = D - ] ~ [ 1 .    
 
 
j g ~  is the long run rate of real per capita GDP growth in country j;  j x is a vector of 
structural, institutional and policy variables that determine long run growth;  j r is a vector 
of regional dummies; a, b and q are parameters, and  j w is an error term assumed to be 
heteroskedastic. In equation (3),  jt g is the rate of growth of per capita GDP in country j 
in period t. The terms  jt v and  jt u are shocks, assumed to have zero mean and finite 
variance.  More specifically,  jt v is assumed to be an external terms of trade shock, while 
jt u captures other shocks, including current account reversals or sudden stops.   jt e  is an 
error term, which is assumed to have a variance component form, and l, j, and g are 
parameters that determine the particular characteristics of the growth process.  Equation 
(4) has the form of an equilibrium correction model and states that the actual rate of 
growth in period t will deviate from the long run rate of growth due to the existence of 
three types of shocks: v t j, u t j and x t j.  Over time, however, the actual rate of growth will 
tend to converge towards it long run value, with the rate of convergence given by l. 
Parameterj , in equation (4), is expected to be positive, indicating that an improvement 
in the terms of trade will result in a (temporary) acceleration in the rate of growth, and 
that negative terms of trade shock are expected to have a negative effect on jt g .
19  If, as 
previous work has found, current account reversals and/or sudden stops have a negative 
effect on growth, we would expect the coefficient g to be significantly negative.   
In terms of the subject of this paper, the main interest is whether the coefficients 
of the external shocks v t j and u t j are different for currency union countries and countries 
                                                 
19   See Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005) for details.   19 
with a currency of their own.  If giving up monetary independence because of 
membership in a currency union is costly, we would expect j to be larger for currency 
union countries, and g to be more negative in currency union countries than in countries 
with a currency of their own.  That is, in the absence of monetary independence and 
exchange rate flexibility, external shocks would be amplified.  If, on the contrary, the loss 
of monetary independence is not costly, these coefficients would be the same – or very 
similar – across the two groups of countries.  
Equations (3) - (4) were estimated using a two-step procedure. In the first step I 
estimate the long run growth equation (3) using a cross-country data set.  These data are 
averages for 1970-2001, and the estimation makes a correction for heteroskedasticity. 
These first stage estimates are then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates to 
replace  j g ~ in the equilibrium error correction model (4).  In the second step, I estimated 
equation (4) using GLS for unbalanced panels; I used both random effects and fixed 
effects estimation procedures.
20   The data set includes 157 countries, for the 1970-2001 
period; not every country has data for every year, however.  See the Data Appendix for 
exact data definition and data sources.  In Sub-Section IV.3 I present some extensions.  
IV.2  Basic Results 
In estimating equation (3) for long-run per capita growth, I followed the standard 
literature on growth, as summarized by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Sachs and 
Warner (1995) and Dollar (1992) among others.  I assume that the rate of growth of GDP 
( j g ~ ) depends on a number of structural, policy and social variables.  More specifically, I 
include the following covariates: the log of initial GDP per capita; the investment ratio; 
the coverage of secondary education, as a proxy for human capital; an index of the degree 
of openness of the economy; the ratio of government consumption relative to GDP; and 
regional dummies.  The results obtained from these first-step estimates are not reported 
due to space considerations. 
In Table 5 I present the results from the second step estimation of the growth 
dynamics equation (4), when random effects were used.  The Table has six columns:  the 
first two contain the results for all countries with a national currency (independently of 
                                                 
20 Due to space considerations, only the random effect results are reported.   20 
their exchange rate and monetary regime).  The next two columns contain the results for 
countries with a currency of their own and flexible exchange rate regimes.  Finally, the 
last two columns contain the results for currency union countries.
21 
As may be seen, the results are quite interesting.  The estimated coefficient of the 
growth gap is, as expected, positive, significant, and smaller than one.  The point 
estimates are on the high side -- between 0.79 and 0.92 --, suggesting that, on average, 
deviations between long run and actual growth get eliminated rather quickly.  Also, as 
expected, the estimated coefficients of the terms of trade shock are always positive, and 
statistically significant, indicating that an improvement (deterioration) in the terms of 
trade results in an acceleration (de-acceleration) in the rate of growth of real per capita 
GDP in our three samples.  The coefficients of the current account reversals and the 
sudden stops variables are significantly negative, in the regressions for the complete 
sample (Columns A and B) and in those for the currency union countries (Columns E and 
F), indicating that these shocks have been associated with a deceleration of growth.  
Interestingly, these coefficients are not significant for the flexible exchange rate 
countries, suggesting that this group has been able to accommodate these external shocks 
without experiencing a significant decline in GDP growth.  From the perspective of this 
paper, what is particularly important is that the point estimates of the shock-related 
coefficients are larger for the currency union countries than for the two samples of 
nations with a currency of their own.  Consider, for example, the specification in columns 
A, C and E.  The point estimates of the terms of trade shock are 0.07 for all countries 
with a national currency, 0.03 for the flexible exchange rate countries, and 0.10 for the 
currency union countries.  The computation t-tests indicate that these coefficients are 
statistically different across equations; the values of these t-tests are 7.8 for the 
comparison of currency union and flexible countries, and 3.81 for the comparison 
between currency union and all countries.  For the specifications in Columns A, B and C 
the point estimates of the current account reversal variable are also larger in absolute 
terms for the currency union countries (-2.30), than for the flexible rates countries (-0.47 
and non significant), and the all countries with a currency group (-0.74). 
                                                 
21 I used the Levy-Yeyati and Stuzenegger (2003b) de facto exchange rate regimes classification.    21 
Overall, then, the results reported in Table 5 indicate that countries that belong to 
a currency union had suffered a greater impact from external shocks than countries with a 
national currency.  The difference in the effects of external shocks is particularly large 
when the currency union countries are compared with nations that have had flexible 
exchange rates.  This result is particularly important, since it is precisely under flexible 
exchange rates that countries are able to exercise fully an independent monetary policy.         
IV.3  Instrumental Variables Estimates and Other Extensions 
  Instrumental Variables:  Some of the results presented above may be subject to 
endogeneity problems.  This is particularly the case of the specification that includes the 
current account reversals as a regressor.   In this section I present results obtained when 
instrumental variables random effect regressions for unbalanced panels were estimated.  
The results obtained are presented in Table 6, for the same three samples:  all countries 
with a national currency, flexible exchange rate nations and currency union countries.  In 
deciding which instruments to use, I took into account the results in the preceding section 
on the probability of a country experiencing a reversal.  The following instruments were 
used:  lagged changes in the international terms of trade, lagged current account balance, 
lagged indicator for occurrence of sudden stop during the previous year, a lagged index 
of occurrence of sudden stops in the country’s group or region, lagged international 
reserves over GDP ratio, lagged rate of growth of domestic credit.  As may be seen from 
Table 6, the results tend to confirm the findings reported in Table 5.   The estimated 
coefficients for both external shocks variables – changes in international terms of trade 
and current account reversals – are significantly larger for the currency union countries 
than for the two samples of countries with a national currency. 
  Asymmetric Terms of Trade Shocks:  The results discussed above were obtained 
under the assumption that positive and negative terms of trade shock have a symmetric 
effect on the dynamics of growth.  This needs not be the case, however.
22  In order to 
investigate this issue re-estimated equation (4) replacing the terms of trade term by two; a 
positive terms of trade shock and a negative terms of trade shock.  The results obtained 
indicate that the effects of terms of trade shocks are asymmetric, with negative terms of 
trade shocks having a larger (negative) effect on growth than positive terms of trade 
                                                 
22 See Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) for a discussion of this issue.   22 
shocks.  The results obtained for the specification with the reversals shock are presented 
in Table 7.   The difference in the point estimate for the positive and negative terms of 
trade shock are particularly large for the currency union countries.  Overall, these 
estimates, once again, confirm our previous findings, in the sense that external shocks 
have a larger effect on growth in currency union countries than in countries with a 
currency of their own. 
  Alternative Measures of External Shocks:  The results reported above were 
obtained using three alternative measures of external shocks:  terms of trade changes, 
current account reversals, and sudden stops of capital inflows.  As pointed out in Section 
III of this paper, there is a close connection between current account reversals and sudden 
stops.  An important question, thus, is the effect on economic activity of crises that are 
characterized by both current account reversals and sudden stops.
23  The results obtained, 
available upon request, tend to confirm those reported in Tables 5 through 7: the 
(negative) effects of external crises on GDP growth tend to be more severe currency 
union countries than in countries with a currency of their own and flexible exchange 
rates. 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
Recently debates on the merits of currency unions have intensified.  At the light of the 
Euro experience a number of authors have argued that some countries –in particular small 
emerging countries – would benefit by joining a currency union.  Most studies on the 
subject have analyzed if specific groups of countries satisfy the Optimal Currency Areas 
criteria.  In this paper I have taken an alternative approach from that of most works on the 
subject.  Instead of analyzing whether the Latin American countries satisfy the traditional 
OCA criteria, such as facing similar external shocks across countries, I have analyzed the 
empirical evidence on the economic performance of countries “without a currency of 
their own,” and I interpret these results from the perspective of the Latin American 
nations.  The empirical analysis presented in this paper was divided in two parts.  First, 
an analysis of the determinants of the probability of a country being subject to: (a) 
“sudden stops” of capital inflows; and/or (b) “current account reversals.”  Both of these 
                                                 
23 I am grateful to Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel for suggesting this line of analysis.   23 
are important questions, since the Latin American nations have traditionally been subject 
to significant fluctuations in capital flows, and have experienced a large number of 
current account crises.  The results obtained from this analysis suggest that belonging to a 
currency union has not lowered the probability of experiencing either a sudden stop or a 
current account reversal.  In the second empirical part of this study, I analyzed the ability 
of monetary union countries to accommodate three types of external shocks: (a) terms of 
trade shocks; (b) sudden stops of capital inflows; and (c) current account reversals.  The 
results obtained – and reported in Section IV of the paper – indicate that the (negative) 
effects of external crises on GDP growth have tended to be more severe currency union 
countries than in countries with a currency of their own and flexible exchange rates.  
These results provide valuable additional information for the debate on the costs and 
benefits of countries giving up their national currencies and joining a currency union.  It 
is important to notice, however, that the results reported here should be interpreted with 
some caution.  The reason for this is that the number of Currency Union countries and 
years in the data set is limited.  There are only three years of the Euro, and most non-euro 
CU countries are rather small.  Additional data in the years to come will make the 













AUSTRALIA  CHINA 
Christmas Island (dependency)  Macau (dependency) 
Cocos (Keeling) Island (dependency)   
Norfolk Island (dependency)  MOROCCO 
Kiribati  Western Sahara 
Nauru   
Tuvalu  NETHERLANDS  
  Netherlands Antilles (dependency) 
DENMARK  Aruba (dependency) 
Faroe Islands (dependency)   
Greenland (dependency)  NEW ZEALAND 
  Niue (dependency) 
ECCA  Tokelau (dependency) 
Anguilla (dependency of UK)  Pitcairn Island (dependency of UK) 
Antigua and Barbuda   
Dominica  SINGAPORE 
Grenada  Brunei 
Montserrat (dependency of UK)   
Saint Kitts and Nevis  SOUTH AFRICA 
Saint Lucia  Lesotho 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  Namibia 
   
FRANCE  UNITED KINGDOM 
French Guiana (dependency)  Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) (dependency) 
French Polynesia (dependency)  Gibraltar (dependency) 
Guadeloupe (dependency)  Saint Helena (dependency) 
Martinique (dependency)  British Indian Ocean Territory (dependency) 
New Caledonia (dependency)   
Reunion (dependency)  USA 
Saint Pierre and Miquelon (dependency)  Northern Mariana Islands (dependency) 
Wallis and Futuna (dependency)  Bermuda (dependency of UK) 
Andorra  British Virgin Islands (dependency of UK) 
  Cayman Islands (dependency of UK) 
SPAIN  Turks and Caicos Islands (dependency of UK) 
Andorra  Bahamas, The 
  Barbados 
BELGIUM  Belize 
Luxembourg  Ecuador (since 2000) 
  Guatemala 
CFA  Liberia 
Benin  Marshall Islands 
Burkina Fasso  Micronesia, Federated States of 
Cameroon  Palau 
Central African Republic  Panama 
Chad   
Congo, Republic of the   
Cote d’Ivoire   
Equatorial Guinea   
Gabon   
Guinea-Bissau   
Mali   
Niger   
Senegal   
Togo   
   
Source: Refers to the year 1996.  Cabasson (2003) 
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Table 2 
Incidence of Sudden Stops: 1970-2001 
 
Region  No sudden stop  Sudden stop 
     
Industrial countries  96.3  3.7 
Latin American and Caribbean  92.2  7.8 
Asia  94.9  5.1 
Africa  93.4  6.6 
Middle East  88.7  11.3 
Eastern Europe  93.7  6.4 
     
Total  93.6  6.4 
     
     Observations  2,943   
     Pearson     
         Uncorrected chi2 (5)  18.84   
         Design-based F(5, 14710)  3.76   




Incidence of Current Account Reversals: 1972-2001 
 
Region  No Reversal  Reversal 
     
Industrial countries  97.6  2.4 
Latin American and Caribbean  84.0  16.0 
Asia  87.9  12.1 
Africa  83.4  16.1 
Middle East  84.0  16.0 
Eastern Europe  85.0  15.0 
     
Total  87.2  12.8 
     
    Observations  2,975   
    Pearson     
         Uncorrected chi2 (5)  77.88   
         Design-based F(5, 14870)  15.57   
          P-value  0.000   
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Table 4 
Determinants of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops 
Random Effects Probit Regressions 
  
Variable  Current Account Reversals  Sudden Stops 
  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F) 
             
Current-Account deficit to GDP  0.10  0.09  --  0.07  0.07  -- 
  (10.21)***  (11.99)***  --  (7.16)***  (9.04)***  -- 
Sudden stop   0.39  0.39  --  --  --  -- 
  (2.04)**  (2.48)**  --  --  --  -- 
Sudden stops in region  2.06  2.25  --  3.96  4.47  -- 
  (4.16)***  (5.25)***  --  (6.71)***  (8.37)***  -- 
Domestic credit growth   0.0002  0.0002  --  -0.0005  -0.0000  -- 
  (1.78)*  (1.75)*  --  (1.11)  (0.45)  -- 
Fiscal deficit to GDP  -0.002  --  --  -0.01  --  -- 
  (0.22)  --  --  (0.85)  --  -- 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.08  -0.04  --  0.23  0.25  -- 
  (1.67)*  (0.86)  --  (3.82)***  (4.22)***  -- 
CU  --  -0.02  0.17  --  0.20  0.26 
  --  (0.14)  (1.26)  --  (0.83)  (1.27) 
             
Observations  1515  1886  2653  1515  1954  2238 
Countries  95  118  143  95  119  127 
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; All regressors are one-period lagged; constant term is 
included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%;   27 
Table 5 
Current Account Reversals, Sudden Stops and Growth  
Random Effects GLS Regressions 
 
Variable  Countries with national 
currency 
Countries with national 
currency and flexible 
exchange rate 
Countries with currency 
union 
  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F) 
             
Growth gap  0.79  0.80  0.87  0.84  0.84  0.92 
  (38.18)***  (39.37)***  (20.97)***  (21.61)***  (12.58)***  (11.09)*** 
Change in terms of trade   0.07  0.07  0.03  0.06  0.10  0.09 
  (11.22)***  (11.08)***  (2.69)***  (4.50)***  (4.59)***  (4.25)*** 
Current account reversal  -0.74  --  -0.47  --  -2.30  -- 
  (4.16)***  --  (0.63)  --  (1.98)**  -- 
Sudden stop  --  -0.28  --  0.21  --  -1.79* 
  --  (2.74)***  --  (0.25)  --  (1.62) 
             
Observations  1642  1616  412  431  192  130 
Countries  84  78  64  63  10  7 
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; constant term is included, but not reported.  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%;   28 
Table 6 
Current Account Reversals, Sudden Stops and Growth  
IV Regressions 









       
Growth gap  0.78  0.78  0.94 
  (31.67)***  (16.33)***  (9.42)*** 
Change in terms of trade   0.06  0.06  0.12 
  (8.22)***  (3.67)***  (3.70)*** 
Current account reversal  -3.27  -5.11  -9.48* 
  (2.42)**  (1.27)  (1.62) 
       
Observations  1336  382  121 
Countries  73  60  7 
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; constant term is included, 
but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%;   29 
Table 7 
Asymmetric Terms of Trade Shocks and Growth  
Random Effects GLS Regressions 
 








       
Growth gap  0.79  0.87  0.84 
  (38.18)***  (20.92)***  (12.56)*** 
Current account reversal  -0.69  -0.55  -2.11 
  (1.95)*  (0.72)  (1.80)* 
Positive change in terms of trade   0.06  0.04  0.07 
  (5.80)***  (2.35)***  (1.89)* 
Negative change in terms of trade   0.09  0.02  0.13 
  (7.77)***  (0.51)  (3.31)*** 
       
Observations  1642  412  192 
Countries  84  64  10 
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; constant term is included, 
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